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Introduction
Much of the extant literature portrays financial innovations as helping economic agents achieve a desired function in the presence of one or more market inefficiencies or imperfections. 1 For example, new securities may be created to allow investors to achieve desired payoffs not spanned by the previously available financial instruments, or loosely to complete markets. Ross (1976) takes this "spanning" view of financial innovation in arguing that the introduction of option contracts improves allocative efficiency when the previously existing set of securities fails to span the state space. 2 Other research presents financial innovations as arising to ameliorate imperfections such as agency conflicts (Ross (1989) ), to reduce transactions costs (Ross (1989) , McConnell and Schwartz (1992) , and Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000)), and to minimize the impact of taxes or regulations (Miller (1986) and Santangelo and Tufano (1996) ). Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) suggest financial innovation has played a key role in reducing the volatility of economic activity. A common element in these papers is that financial innovations arise in response to market inefficiencies or imperfections and provide the benefit of ameliorating at least one inefficiency or imperfection. 3 This generally benign view of financial innovation is unsurprising, since, as noted by Tufano (2003) , "bringing new securities to market requires the voluntary cooperation of both issuers and investors."
Financial institutions' ability to create securities providing state-contingent payoffs tailored to the needs or desires of specific investors or groups of investors seems especially conducive to improving allocative efficiency. But there is a dark side to the ability to create instruments with tailored payoffs. If some group of investors misunderstands financial markets or suffers from cognitive biases that cause them to assign incorrect probability weights to events, financial institutions can exploit these misunderstandings and cognitive biases by creating financial instruments that pay off in the states that investors overweight and do not pay off (or pay off less highly) in the states that investors underweight, leading the investors to value the new instruments more highly than they would if they understood financial markets and correctly evaluated information about probabilities of future events. That is, financial institutions can exploit investors by creating precisely the securities or other financial instruments for which investors are willing to overpay. Some innovative financial instruments may be created solely or primarily for this reason, rather than for the benign reasons 1 Tufano (2003) provides a thorough summary of the literature on financial innovation. 2 Qualifying this view, Elul (1995) demonstrates that introduction of non-redundant assets in incomplete markets does not always improve welfare. The introduction of a new asset may make some or all agents worse off. Allen and Gale (1991) argue that relaxing short-sale restrictions by allowing unlimited short-sales may not be desirable.
3 Frame and White (2004) and Tufano (2003) also discuss the fact that some financial innovations arise in response to regulations and differences in taxation. As Frame and White (2004) point out, whether one sees this innovation as beneficial or deleterious will depend on one's views of the regulatory or differential taxation regime.
1 that have been the focus of much of the literature.
We provide evidence on the dark side of financial innovation by focusing on Stock Participation Accreting Redemption Quarterly-pay Securities (SPARQS), a subset of the U.S. publicly issued structured equity products (SEPs). SEPs are medium-term notes issued by financial institutions and have payments based on another company's common stock price, multiple common stock prices (e.g., baskets of common stocks), a stock index, or multiple stock indices. They are designed and issued by banks and investment banks and typically marketed to retail investors. SPARQS, created and marketed by Morgan Stanley, are the most popular of the SEPs with payoffs based on the prices of individual common stocks. An example is provided by the SPARQS based on the price of National Semiconductor Corporation common stock that were issued by Morgan Stanley on April 23, 2004. Although this SPARQS issue had cash flows based on the price of National Semiconductor stock, the securities were issued by, and were obligations of, Morgan Stanley. We present relevant evidence and argue that it is difficult to rationalize investors' purchases of SPARQS within the context of any plausible normative model of the behavior of rational investors. The SPARQS appear to offer no benefit to investors that is not already provided by the existing set of available financial instruments, and their negative abnormal returns are large enough that the SPARQS' investors' welfare would likely be improved if they simply invested in bank certificates of deposit.
Between 1992 and 2005 investors purchased over $50 billion of SEPs from investment banks or the investment banking arms of banks, indicating that at least some retail investors include these products in their portfolios in significant quantities. Through the end of 2005, about 43% of the SEPs had payoffs based on individual equities, about 48% had payoffs based on stock indexes, and about 9% had payoffs based on multiple stocks (e.g., baskets of stocks) or multiple stock indices.
Structured equity-linked notes primarily are marketed to retail clients, as noted by Pratt (1995) and Bethel and Ferrel (2007) . Frequently, the issuing financial institution arranges for the structured product to be listed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), NASDAQ, or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) following issuance, providing at least some secondary market liquidity to the buyers of the product.
It is worth emphasizing that structured equity products are liabilities of the issuing financial institution and not of the company whose stock is the underlying asset. An immediate implication is that the designs of structured products are neither determined nor even influenced by the financing needs and capital structure policies of the company whose stock is the underlying asset. Rather, the issuing financial institution sells the structured product, and then trades in the underlying common stock and possibly derivative contracts in order dynamically to hedge the resulting equity 2 exposure created by its short position in the structured product. The issuing financial institution can select any payoff pattern that it thinks investors will find appealing, subject to the caveat that the issuing financial institution will avoid issuing structures that are extremely costly or difficult to hedge. 4 We focus on the SPARQS because they are the most popular of the listed SEPs. (2007) document that the typical SEP based on an individual equity is similar to a SPARQS issue in that it has a payoff that is a concave function of the underlying stock price, a short original time to maturity, and a high coupon. 5 We conduct a thorough analysis of the pricing of the SPARQS on their issue dates and find that the primary market investors pay on average an eight percent premium for these securities, where the premium is defined as the difference between the offering price and an estimate of the fair value. This is a large premium for a product that is callable after about six months and has a maximum maturity of slightly more than one year, as it implies that the purchaser locks in a negative abnormal return of at least eight percent per year relative to a dynamically adjusted portfolio of the underlying stock and bonds with the same risk. Examination of the behavior of the secondary market price premia to the model values over time indicates a gradual adjustment toward the model values. While we do not estimate the values of the other types of SEPs, the information we have suggests that they also tend to have markups of about the same size.
Departing from the risk-neutral measure, we demonstrate that these premia are large enough, and the expected lives of the SPARQS short enough, that under the objective measure the expected returns on the SPARQS are less than the risk-free rate of interest. In a standard model of portfolio choice, such a security is rationally purchased by an investor only if its returns covary positively with the investor's marginal utility (Merton (1982) ). The returns of the SPARQS covary positively with the broad market indices, and for the vast majority of investors almost certainly covary positively with consumption and negatively with marginal utility. Thus, it is difficult to rationalize primary market purchases of SPARQS by investors who hold portfolios that are positively correlated with or uncorrelated with the broad market indexes. Such SPARQS investors would have been better off investing in bank certificates of deposit, and it seems unlikely that investor purchases of SEPs can be explained by any plausible normative model of the behavior of rational investors. 6
It is also unlikely that SPARQS satisfy any hedging needs of retail investors. The payoffs of SPARQS are qualitatively similar to those of covered calls, but SPARQS are callable by the issuer at a time-varying schedule of call prices, complicating their use as hedging instruments.
Even for positions such as naked long put options for which SPARQS at first glance seem like a reasonable hedge, hedges involving ordinary exchange-traded options and the underlying stock seem more natural. Thus, hedging motives are unlikely to explain investors' demand for SPARQS.
The SPARQS also do not provide tax advantages, are not particularly liquid, and do not appear to help investors avoid transactions costs.
Investment banks designing and selling SEPs is an example of a conflict of interest between financial institutions and their customers, about which there is a large empirical literature. Part of that literature addresses whether commercial banks acting as underwriters exploited information asymmetries to take advantage of public customers both before the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act and after banks were again permitted to underwrite some debt issues in the 1980s and 1990s. 7
In a recent survey Mehran and Stulz (2007) conclude that the evidence is "unambiguous" that the hypothesized "adverse impacts [on investors] simply do not exist." In marked contrast, though in a different context, we find that in selling its own (equity-linked) notes at least one underwriter clearly does take advantage of its customers.
Other researchers who have found that investors pay more than the fair market values for innovative securities include Rogalski and Seward (1991) and Jarrow and O'Hara (1989) , who examined foreign currency warrants and Primes and Scores, respectively. These researchers argue that the securities they consider provide hedging benefits to investors, so their results do not have the negative implications for the products that ours do. Outside the U.S. markets, Szymanowska, Horst, and Veld (2005) estimate the values of reverse exchangeable securities issued in The Netherlands by ABN AMRO with payoffs based on the prices of other common stocks, while Baule, Entrop, and Wilkens (2005) calculate margins in the German retail structured products market using a sample 6 Such strong statements cannot be made about many other high-cost financial products, for example mutual funds with high loads. Because an investor can hold mutual fund shares for several or even many years the expected return on a high-load mutual fund can exceed than the riskless rate.
7 See, e.g., Kroszner and Rajan (1994) , Puri (1994) , Drucker and Puri (2005) , and Drucker and Puri (2006) .
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of German "discount certificates" based on the prices of individual common stocks. 8 Burth, Kraus, and Wohlwend (2001) provide evidence about the pricing of Swiss structured products based on individual equities, which also have sizable markups. None of these researchers estimate the expected returns under the objective measures, so again their results do not have the negative implications about the products that ours do. 9
The next section of the paper briefly describes the market for SEPs and the SPARQS that are the focus of our analysis. Section 3 analyzes the pricing of the SPARQS at the offer date and their post-issue performance. Section 4 departs from the risk-neutral measure used for valuation and
shows that reasonable estimates of expected returns under the objective measure are less than the riskless rate. Section 5 discusses the implications of our findings and briefly concludes.
Structured Equity Products
Structured equity products evolved from related equity-linked instruments that were issued in the 1980's. 10 These predecessor instruments typically were issued by non-financial corporations to raise funds, and were underwritten by investment banks in the same way that other corporate securities often are. These predecessor instruments typically converted into, or had payoffs based on, the issuing firm's common stock. An example is provided by Preferred Equity Redemption
Cumulative Stock (PERCS), which is a form of convertible preferred stock created by Morgan
Stanley in 1988 and issued by a number of non-financial corporations during the late 1980's and early 1990's, using Morgan Stanley as the underwriter (see Harty (1992) , Pratt (1994) , and Chen, Kensinger, and Pu (1994) ). 11 As the market evolved in the early 1990s, several investment banks sold SEPs in private transactions in which the investment bank functioned as both the issuer and underwriter and the payoffs were based on the common stock of another company. In July 1992, Merrill Lynch issued the first public index-linked structured note in which the issuing firm and 8 Both the Netherlands reverse exchangeable securities and the German discount certificates have concave payoff functions and are similar to U.S. SEPs based on individual equities.
9 Some insurance companies sell equity-indexed annuities that are similar to some publicly offered SEPs with payoffs based on equity indexes. Bernard and Boyle (2008) argue that these products are designed to exploit investors' cognitive biases in evaluating probabilistic information.
10 Yet earlier antecedents are described in Chapter 2 of Mason, Merton, Perold, and Tufano (1995) . 11 PERCS were convertible preferred stock with a mandatory conversion date typically about three years after the issue date. The conversion ratio varied with the price of the underlying stock in such a way as to create a capped payoff equivalent to the payoff of a covered call strategy using an out-of-the-money three-year call option. The PERCS also paid dividends that exceeded the dividends paid by the underlying common stock. According to the SDC database, PERCS were issued by 16 companies between 1991 and 1996, including Sears Roebuck, Texas Instruments, General Motors, K-Mart, RJR, and Citicorp. Related competing products were developed and underwritten by Morgan Stanley's competitors. See Schroth (2006) for a discussion of underwriters' innovations in the equity-linked products market.
underwriter were the same. 12 These Market Index Target-Term Securities (MITTS) were linked to the performance of the S&P 500 Index and guaranteed investors the return of invested principal and capped participation in the index returns. In July of 1993, Salomon Brothers sold the first publicly offered SEP based on an individual equity price in which the issuer and underwriter were the same entity. Salomon's Equity-Linked Securities (ELKS) offered investors a high coupon (6.75%) and capped participation in the stock performance of Digital Equipment Corporation, a non-dividend paying stock, similar to an income generating covered call position in the underlying stock.
Publicly issued structured equity products typically are marketed to retail investors (Bethel and Ferrel (2007) ). As the SEPs market evolved in the mid-1990s, considerable uncertainty surrounded the direction of future Internal Revenue Service treatment of structured products. According to Pratt (1994) , the IRS originally required separate treatment of the debt and equity option portions.
In fact, due to the uncertainty about the tax treatment of structured products, Merrill Lynch placed all of the original MITTS with tax-deferred accounts. Some uncertainty remains even for recent issues, 13 and it appears that the structured equity products are typically marketed to investors with tax deferred (e.g., self-directed IRA) accounts. 14 It does not appear that the publicly issued SEPs provide any significant tax benefit to investors.
Secondary market liquidity in SEPs is limited (Bethel and Ferrel (2007) ). Some SEPs are listed on exchanges, for example the AMEX, with the issuing firms acting as market makers. Some of these exchange-listed SEPs trade nearly every day, but trading volumes are small and on some days there are no trades. 15 The other SEPs that trade only over-the-counter of course have very limited secondary market liquidity.
12 As Baubonis, Gastineau, and Purcell (1993) note, banks issued equity-linked certificates of deposit prior to the first Merrill Lynch MITTS in 1992. These prior equity-linked CDs were FDIC insured CDs, which differ from SEPs since they are not registered debt and offer investors protection against the issuer's default. 13 The pricing supplement for the Morgan Stanley/National Semiconductor SPARQS issued on April 30, 2004 reads in part: "There is no direct legal authority as to the proper tax treatment of the SPARQS, and consequently our special tax counsel is unable to render an opinion as to their proper characterization for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Therefore, significant aspects of the tax treatment of the SPARQS are uncertain. Pursuant to the terms of the SPARQS, you have agreed with us to treat a SPARQS as an investment unit consisting of (i) a terminable forward contract and (ii) a deposit with us of a fixed amount of cash to secure your obligation under the terminable forward contract, . . . . The terminable forward contract (i) requires you (subject to our call right) to purchase National Semiconductor Stock from us at maturity, and (ii) allows us, upon exercise of our call right, to terminate the terminable forward contract by returning your deposit and paying to you an amount of cash equal to the difference between the call price and the deposit. If the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") were successful in asserting an alternative characterization for the SPARQS, the timing and character of income on the SPARQS and your tax basis for National Semiconductor Stock received in exchange for the SPARQS might differ." See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895421/000095010304000641/0000950103-04-000641.txt.
14 We thank Gang Hu for verifying that the SPARQS almost never appear in an extensive dataset of institutional trades.
15 Anecdotal evidence suggests that limited liquidity has been an issue from the outset of the market. For example, after Salomon Brothers issued an exchange-listed Equity-Linked Security (ELKS) in 1994, one trader noted "the guys who created [ELKS] and the secondary market traders went in separate directions" (Pratt (1995) Table 1 reveal that of the $50 billion investors have paid for structured equity products in the U.S., roughly 43% of the proceeds have been from products linked to individual equities, 48% from index-linked products, and the remaining 9% from products linked to multiple stocks or indices. This sample used in Table 1 comprises to our knowledge the entire universe of publicly registered structured equity-linked notes issued by financial institutions in the U.S. during the period 1992-2005, excluding private, over-the-counter transactions. 16 To be included in the sample, a product must be issued and underwritten by the same financial institution and have a payoff dependent upon the price or return of another firm's equity, an equity index, or multiple equities or indices (for example, baskets of equities or the difference in the percentage changes of two indices). 17 Table 2 lists the indices that are most frequently referenced by the index-linked products. The best-known U.S. equity indices, the S&P 500, NASDAQ-100, and Dow Jones Industrial Average, 16 We constructed the sample by first identifying every financial institution that issued an equity-linked note that was listed on the AMEX or included in the Mergent database. The issuers are ABN AMRO, Bear Stearns, Bank of America, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Citibank (Salomon), CSFB, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, UBS, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo. We then searched the EDGAR database of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for all issues by these financial institutions and identified all structured equity-linked notes, regardless of whether they were ever listed on the AMEX or included in the Mergent database. Because the SEC's EDGAR database includes all registered issues, the only SEPs that might be missed are those issued by a financial institution that was not included on our list of issuers because it never issued a structured equity-linked note that was listed on the AMEX or included in the Mergent database. As a check, we compared our sample to the instruments identified as structured equity-linked products in Mergent's Corporate Bond Source and at www.Quantumonline.com. All products identified as structured equity-linked products in Mergent's Corporate Bond Source and at www.Quantumonline.com appear in our sample, suggesting that our search of the E.D.G.A.R. database collected the entire universe or nearly the entire universe of registered structured equity-linked notes.
17 The sample includes some U.S. SEPs based on non-U.S. equities or indices, including some that are described as "currency protected." These currency protected products often have a dollar-denominated payoff based on the local currency return of a non-U.S. equity or index. Table 3 lists the underlying common stocks that were used as the reference stocks for at least five different structured equity product issues linked to individual equities. There is a heavy concentration in technology stocks and large, high-profile stocks. Intel, Cisco Systems, Texas Instruments, Motorola, and Cendant are the five most common reference stocks and together accounted for 103 issues, or roughly 12% of the total sample of notes linked to individual equities. We focus on the SPARQS for several reasons. First, the 69 issues and total proceeds of $2,176,745,314 were both the largest number of issues and greatest total proceeds of any of the products based on individual equity prices. Second, different SPARQS were structured consistently, making them well suited for a broad analysis. Third, the bulk of the other products based on individual equity prices issued by both Morgan Stanley and other investment banks are qualitatively similar to the SPARQS, and some are very nearly identical (e.g., the callable STRIDES 8 issued by Merrill Lynch). This suggests that our results for the SPARQS are likely to generalize to many of the other products. Fourth, the SPARQS are relatively short-term: they have maturities of slightly over one year (average = 1.15 years) and are callable after six months (average = 0.6 years). This means that good volatility information is available from the implied volatilities of traded options and the possible pricing errors due to our neglect of stochastic volatility and interest rates are less important than they would be for the longer-term products, reducing the risk that valuation errors in our pricing model affect the conclusions. Finally, the fact that 64 of the 69 issues were listed on the AMEX allows us to estimate the post-issue performance (i.e., abnormal returns) of the SPARQS.
Pricing and Expected Returns of SPARQS

Value on the Issue Date
We estimate the values of the SPARQS using a standard approach that builds on the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) framework in which under the risk-neutral probability the underlying stock follows the geometric Brownian motion
where W is a Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability, S is the underlying stock price, σ is the volatility of the underlying stock, and r is the riskless rate of interest. The Black-Scholes-
Merton partial differential equation for the SPARQS value V (S, t) is
The terms of the SPARQS provide the boundary conditions for equation (2). 18
In particular, each SPARQS issue has an exchange ratio that determines the payoff in the event that the SPARQS is held to maturity. If the SPARQS are not called or terminated early, at maturity each SPARQS pays the final coupon and also pays an amount equal to the product of the exchange ratio and the final price of the underlying equity. 19 This provides the terminal boundary
where R is the exchange ratio and c T is the final coupon paid at maturity T . The exchange ratio is commonly either one or one-half, so a SPARQS typically roughly corresponds to either one or one-half share of the underlying stock, respectively.
18 If the underlying stock pays dividends equation (2) will hold before and after each ex-dividend date, with a boundary condition at the ex-dividend date connecting the solutions.
19 Adjustments to the exchange ratio are made for corporate events such as stock splits.
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The terminal boundary condition (3) received provides an internal rate of return of 20.50%. In particular, the call price on each date t for which the securities are callable satisfies the equation
where P 0 is the original issue price, C(t) is the call price at time t, y is the specified required yield-to-call, c t i is the i-th interim cash flow (interest payment) paid by the SPARQS at time t i , τ i is the time from the issue date to the i-th interest payment measured using the 30/360 day-count convention, and τ is the time from the issue date to t, again measured using the 30/360 day-count convention.
This call provision provides the upper spatial boundary for (2). It has the effect of capping the return to the SPARQS so that the maximum return is equal to the specified yield y, and causes the SPARQS to have a payoff similar to that of a covered call position in the underlying stock where the call price of the SPARQS plays a role analogous to the strike price of the call option in the covered call position. (A difference is that the call price of the SPARQS varies over time.) That is, the SPARQS can be interpreted as analogous to a covered call, in which the buyer sells the call back to Morgan Stanley in exchange for the coupons. The boundary at which Morgan Stanley calls the SPARQS is a free boundary determined as part of the solution, assuming that Morgan Stanley determines the call policy in order to minimize the value of the SPARQS.
Finally, the SPARQS have a "clean-up" provision under which they will be terminated early in exchange for an estimate of the present value of the remaining cash flows if the underlying stock price becomes very low. Specifically, in the event that the underlying stock price closes below a specified price, usually $2 per share, on two consecutive days, a "Price Acceleration Event" occurs.
This accelerates maturity of the SPARQS issue to that date, and the investor receives the product of the exchange ratio and the closing stock price plus the net present value of all future coupons, computed using an estimate of the term structure of zero-coupon rates on Morgan Stanley's senior unsecured debt. 20 This early termination or "acceleration" provision provides the lower spatial boundary for the partial differential equation (2).
The terms of the SPARQS are selected so that the offering price is equal to the product of the exchange ratio and the stock price on the offering date. Because Morgan Stanley's marketing costs, hedging costs, any other costs, and profit are embedded in the offering price, the offer price must exceed a reasonable estimate of the fair value. As mentioned above, the exchange ratio is commonly either one or one-half, so the SPARQS can be interpreted as similar to a covered-call position on either one or one-half share. Using the pricing model described above, we first compute estimates of the fair values of the SPARQS as of the dates they were offered for sale. This requires several parameter values for each issue, of which the volatility σ is the most important. Because the SPARQS, if called, are likely to be called early, we use the implied volatility on the SPARQS offering date of the call option contract in the OptionMetrics database that: (i) has a time to expiration that most closely matches the time to first call of the SPARQS; and (ii) has a strike price equal to the SPARQS call price as of the first call date, adjusted (divided) by the exchange ratio. The daily stock prices and returns of the underlying stocks used in the analysis come from the CRSP daily files, and the historical values of LIBOR for the offering dates were collected from Bloomberg. Given these parameter values, and the partial differential equation (2), we take the log transform to obtain a partial differential equation with constant coefficients and then approximate the solution using a standard finite difference scheme described in Appendix 1.
For each SPARQS, Table 4 presents the estimate of value on the offering date, the issue price, and the premium of the offer price over the value estimate. The table also includes some information about the SPARQS and the inputs used in the valuation model. The average offering price at the offering date is 8.77% above the calculated model price, indicating that primary investors are paying a large premium for these securities. The value-weighted average premium, 7.71%, is only slightly smaller. The finding that the value-weighted premium is slightly smaller than the equal-weighted premium indicates that the premia on larger issues tend to be lower than those on smaller issues. Given that the SPARQS are callable after six months and have an average initial term-to-maturity of slightly more than one year, the magnitudes of the equally and value-weighted premia are impressive. These results imply that investors who purchase the SPARQS at the offering prices can expect to suffer average abnormal returns of -8.77% (equal-weighted) or -7.71% (valueweighted) over six to twelve months relative to dynamically adjusted benchmarks formed from the underlying stocks and bonds. As we see below, these premia are large enough that reasonable estimates of the expected returns on the SPARQS are less than the risk free rate of interest.
Post-Issue Return Performance
The results in Section 3.1 indicate that investors who purchase the SPARQS at the offering prices on average pay a premium of about 8% over estimates of their values. Initial over-pricing of this magnitude implies that the SPARQS will subsequently under-perform the proper risk-adjusted return benchmarks formed from the underlying stocks and bonds. This section examines the secondary market performance of the SPARQS subsequent to the issue date, and confirms that investors in the SPARQS do in fact suffer negative abnormal returns following the issue date. Examining the secondary market returns requires a return metric for the SPARQS. We construct a total return measure, defined as the change in the invoice or "full" price, divided by the invoice price. Using the fact that the invoice price is the sum of the traded or "clean" price and accrued interest, the daily return from date t − 1 to date t is:
where P i,t and P i,t−1 are the closing market prices on trading dates t and t − 1 respectively, CP N is the periodic interest payment, and AC i,t and AC i,t−1 are the accrued interest on trading dates t and t − 1 respectively. The accrued interest portion tracks the part of the periodic coupon the seller of a bond owes to the buyer upon settlement. Since the coupon is paid to the bondholder as of the close of business on the record date, which is a specified number of calendar days before the payment date, the accrued interest component resets to zero on the day after the ex-coupon date and the condition AC i,t < AC i,t−1 is satisfied only on this date. Thus, an investor who owned the security on the record date will receive the coupon on the distribution date.
The SPARQS derive their value from the underlying stock price and their returns can be described by the model
where i = 1, . . . , N indexes the SPARQS and their underlying stocks, R i,t is the return on the ith SPARQS on date t, r i,t is the return on the common stock underlying the ith SPARQS, r t is the riskless rate on date t, and
, where V i (S i,t , t) is the value of the ith SPARQS given by the pricing model in Section 3.1. With this definition Ω i,t is the elasticity of the SPARQS price with respect to the stock price. While equation (6) holds only approximately because it treats the elasticity Ω i,t as constant within each day, we expect the approximation to be excellent.
If the SPARQS are priced correctly relative to the stock without any markup or premium then the residual η i,t in (6) would be close to zero, where the difference from zero is due to possible miss-specification of the pricing model, inherent approximation errors in its numerical solution, the assumption that the elasticity Ω i,t is constant within each day, and features of the market microstructure such as the discreteness of price quotations. If the SPARQS are over-priced relative to the stock then cumulative residuals of the form t η i,t should be negative. This model thus provides another perspective on the magnitude of the markups or premia embedded in the offering prices of the SPARQS.
We also consider the risk-adjusted performance of the SPARQS relative to the market index.
Applying the market model to the underlying stock, the return for the underlying stock is
where r i,t − r t is the excess return of the underlying stock i on date t over the risk-free rate of return r t and r M,t − r t is the excess return on the value-weighted CRSP market portfolio on date t.
Combining equations (6) and (7), the market model for the SPARQS based on the index returns is
If the SPARQS underperform on a risk-adjusted basis, the accumulated (over event-time) averages across all SPARQS issues of the residuals in equations (6) and (8) should be negative.
Similarly, if the underlying stocks underperform their risk-adjusted benchmark, equation (7) will have negative cumulative residuals. Testing these hypotheses requires averaging the residuals across issues in addition to accumulating them over time. A complication arises because the numbers of issues in the averages differ on different dates because some SPARQS drop out of the sample due to calls and the price acceleration event that occurred on one issue. This complication is handled by first computing the average returns of the available SPARQS (the inside sums over i in equations (9), (10), and (11) below), and then cumulating the average residual returns over event time (the outside sums over t).
Some notation is required to formulate the test statistics. Let t, and later u, index event time,
i.e. t = 0 is the issue date, t = 1 is the first date after issue, etc. Let τ i be the calendar-time issue date of the ith SPARQS. For example, 1 January 1995 might be calendar day 0, and the ith SPARQS might have been issued on calendar day τ i = 1, 321 (which is event day 0 for this issue).
Thus τ i + t is the calendar date t days following the issue date of the ith SPARQS. Let A t denote the set of the indices of the SPARQS that are available for trading on event day t. Thus, A t is the set of SPARQS indices that have not been called or had a price acceleration event on the tth date after issue. Initially (at event-time 0) the set A 0 has N elements A 0 = {1, 2, 3, . . . , N }, where N = 52 is the total number of SPARQS for which we have sufficient secondary market price data.
As some SPARQS are called, or disappear due to a price acceleration event, some indices disappear from A t . Let card(A t ) denote the cardinality of A t , that is card(A t ) is the number of SPARQS that 14 are still available for trading on event-date t. We are interested in testing the hypotheses:
where the residuals being summed are defined in equations (6)- (8). Appendix 2 describes the computation of standard errors for the test statistics above. (9) from the SPARQS pricing model (6). In this model, testing the hypothesis that the average residuals in equation (9) Table 5 , the percentage price premium of the SPARQS exhibits a gradual decay over the first 140 post-issue trading days. After 140 trading days, or somewhat over six months, the premium shows a modest increase. This increase occurs because the period of call protection has ended, and some of the SPARQS are being 21 We conjecture that the slow decay of the premium and negative abnormal performance are not arbitraged away because the SPARQS are hard to borrow.
called. (Note that the sample size decreases from 52 to 39 between post-issue days 120 and 140, and further declines to 31 by day 200.) These calls change the composition of the sample because SPARQS that are highly likely to be called have small premiums-the payment in the event of call is deterministic, so there is little room for error or disagreement about the value of an issue that is highly likely to be called.
The actual returns of the SPARQS are determined by both their performance relative to the underlying stocks and the performance of the underlying stocks. Panel B presents evidence about the performance of the underlying stocks relative to the market index-specifically, it presents the CARRs in equation (10) based on the market model (7) for the underlying stock. After the first two days, these CARRs do not exhibit any significant under-or over-performance of the underlying stocks relative to the market index. However, the post-event returns for the first and second days are negative and significant, indicating brief underperformance of the underlying stocks. This is an interesting pattern since the SPARQS issues have no impact on the fundamentals of the underlying stocks, and presumably convey no information about the stocks. 22
Panel C of Table 5 examines the performance of the SPARQS relative to the market index by presenting the CARRs in equation (11) for the SPARQS relative to the underlying stock and prevent the return of the SPARQS relative to the market from being significant. Thus, there is evidence only for underperformance of the SPARQS relative to the underlying stocks. Table 6 finishes the examination of the post-issue performance by presenting buy-and-hold returns to the SPARQS and the underlying stocks, as well as the returns on several benchmarks. The first row of Panel A shows that the average return to the SPARQS over the first 200 post-issue trade dates is −6.02%, where the average return is computed by cumulating the daily averages for each event day. The second row shows the average performance of benchmarks formed by cumulating average daily returns of the form r t + Ω i,t (r i,t − r t ). These returns are those of a portfolio with an exposure to the underlying stock return chosen to match the sensitivity or elasticity Ω i,t of the SPARQS return. This benchmark has stock price exposure identical to that of the SPARQS, and 
Expected Returns of the SPARQS
The analysis in Section 3 provides evidence of large markups on the SPARQS and post-issuance underperformance consistent with the large markups. Given that the SPARQS have original maturities of only slightly more than one year and many issues are called after six months, the markups are large enough to suggest that the expected returns of the SPARQS might be less than the risk-free rate of interest. This section presents evidence that this is in fact the case for reasonable estimates of the expected returns of the underlying assets.
To estimate the expected return on each of the SPARQS, we assume that the expected return on the underlying stock is a constant µ, and in particular that the stock price follows the geometric Brownian motion
where W is a Brownian motion under the objective probability. We estimate the expected return µ using both the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama-French three-factor asset pricing model, with several different estimates of the market and factor risk premia.
Second, because the stock price process (12) is a diffusion process and the SPARQS payoff is a function of the stock price (and time), the conditional expected payoff Y (S, t) = E [payoff | S, t] satisfies the Kolmogorov backward equation
with boundary conditions determined by the terms of the SPARQS. This equation is similar to the partial differential equation (2) satisfied by the value of the SPARQS, except that (13) contains the expected return on the stock, µ, instead of the risk-free rate r, and does not include the discounting term −rY .
The terminal boundary condition for Y is the payout to the SPARQS at maturity date T ,
, which is the same terminal boundary for the SPARQS value V given in equation (3) 
the schedule of prices S(t) at which a SPARQS issue is called is determined as part of the solution in order to minimize the value of the SPARQS. For Y , the upper boundary is a fixed boundary determined by the previous solution for S(t), i.e. Y (S(t), t) = V (S(t), t) = C(t).
The lower spatial boundary condition comes from the price acceleration event discussed in subsection 3.1, and is identical to the lower boundary for V , i.e. Y (S, t) = V (S, t), where S is the stock price at which the price acceleration event occurs.
As in subsection 3.1 we compute the solution of the p.d.e. by using a logarithmic transformation to obtain a partial differential equation with constant coefficients, and then approximate the solution using a standard finite difference scheme. The solution provides an estimate of the expected payoff Y (S, t) for each point in the domain. The expected returns to investing in a SPARQS at the initial offering are then computed as
where S 0 is the price of the underlying stock on the issue date (time 0), Y (S 0 , 0) is the expected payoff conditional on S 0 , P 0 is the offering price, AC 0 is the accrued interest on the issue date, t call is the call date, and T is the maturity. This equation slightly understates the expected returns, as some of the coupons are received before the call date or maturity and the simple sum {i|t i <min(t call ,T )} c(t i ) does not reflect any reinvestment of these coupons.
These calculations require estimates of the expected returns µ of each underlying stock. We compute these using both the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Fama-French threefactor asset pricing model, with several different estimates of the market and factor risk premia. To use the CAPM we need market model "beta" coefficient estimates, which we obtain by estimating the regression
for each underlying stock using five years of monthly data leading up to the SPARQS issue date, where i = 1, . . . , N indexes the stocks underlying the N SPARQS, r i,t − r t is the excess return of the underlying stock i on date t over the risk-free return r t , and r M,t − r t is the excess return on the value-weighted CRSP market portfolio on date t over the risk-free rate of return. Using the estimated β for each stock, the expected return estimates obtained in equation (15) are combined with estimates of the expected excess return on the market portfolio, E (r M,t − r t ), to yield the expected returns on the underlying stocks E (r i,t ):
The extant literature does not completely agree about the magnitude of the equity premium.
Fama and French (2002) suggest that widely used risk-premium estimates of about 8%, which are based on historical returns of stocks over bonds, overstate the market risk premium during our sample period. Welch (2000) reports on a comprehensive survey of researchers' estimates of the equity risk premium and presents survey evidence that the average estimated equity premium for a horizon of one year is approximately 6.5% and the estimated 10-year equity premium is roughly 8%.
Due to the lack of consensus on the equity risk-premium, we use several different estimates. To interpret these results, note that on the issue date the SPARQS have beta coefficients that are typically somewhat greater than one-half of the betas of the underlying stocks. While the SPARQS betas are not constant over time (they go to zero as the call boundary is approached, and increase toward the stock price beta as the stock price drops), a beta of somewhat over one-half is a reasonable "back of the envelope" estimate. Combined with the average underlying stock beta of 1.86, this suggests that the average SPARQS beta is about one. This beta, taken alone, suggests that the average expected return is about equal to the market risk premium. But these risk premia are almost complete offset by the negative abnormal returns stemming from the markups on the issue dates.
Since the SPARQSs' underlying stocks tend to be large growth stocks, the market model likely over-estimates the expected returns on the underlying stocks. Over-estimating the expected returns on the underlying stocks results in overstated expected returns on the SPARQS themselves. For this reason, we also use the three-factor model of Fama and French (1992) to estimate the expected return µ of each of the underlying stocks. The procedure is the same for the market model where the first step is to estimate factor loadings for each of the underlying stocks,
where r M,t − r f,t , SM B, and HM L are the excess returns on the market portfolio, small stocks over large stocks, and high book-to-market stocks over low book-to-market stocks. The average factor loadings on the market, SMB, and HML are 1.528, 0.244, and −0.464, respectively. The −0.464 loading on the book-to-market factor is consistent with the underlying stocks being growth stocks. Combining the factor loadings with estimates of the expected returns to the factors using the equation
results in estimates of the expected returns µ used in the calculation of the expected payoffs.
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Panel B of Table 7 presents the average expected returns to the SPARQS based on the Fama- 1993 to estimate the risk premia on SMB and HML, but use 6% and 8%, respectively, for the market risk premium. The average expected returns range from −0.27% to −1.71%, depending on the estimates of the factor risk premia. For three of the four cases zero is within two standard errors of the estimate, and we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the SPARQS' expected returns are greater than zero. However, we can reject the hypothesis that the expected returns are greater than 2%, which is less than the average risk-free rate that prevailed during the period. Thus, these estimates provide strong evidence that the expected returns on the SPARQSs are less than the risk-free rate.
The finding that SPARQSs have expected returns below the risk-free rate is striking because the values and returns of the SPARQS covary positively with the broad market indices, suggesting quite strongly that their returns covary positively with both investors' aggregate wealth and aggregate consumption, and covary negatively with investors' marginal utilities. In a standard model of portfolio choice, a security with expected return less than the risk free rate is rationally purchased by an investor only if its returns covary positively with the investor's marginal utility (Merton (1982) ). Thus, it is difficult to rationalize primary market purchases of SPARQS by investors whose portfolios have positive or zero correlation with the broad market indexes.
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
We present evidence that SPARQS, the most popular of the listed U.S. structured equity products, are sufficiently overpriced at their initial offerings that they have expected returns less than the riskless rate. While our analysis is limited to SPARQS designed and sold by Morgan Stanley, other investment banks offer very similar products. 24 In a standard model of the portfolio choice, such a security is rationally purchased by an investor only if its returns covary positively with the investor's marginal utility (Merton (1982) ). The returns of the SPARQS covary positively with the broad market indices, and for the vast majority of investors almost certainly covary positively with consumption and negatively with marginal utility. Thus, the finding that SPARQSs expected returns are less than the riskless rate make it difficult to rationalize primary market purchases of SPARQS by investors who hold portfolios that are positively correlated or uncorrelated with the broad market indexes. Such SPARQS investors would have been better off investing in bank certificates of deposit. SPARQS also appear not to be motivated by any desire to benefit from a preferential tax treatment, circumvent regulations, reduce agency conflicts, or reduce transactions costs.
Relatedly, it seems unlikely that SPARQS satisfy any hedging needs of retail investors. The payoffs of SPARQS are qualitatively similar to those of covered calls and, with the exception of naked puts, it is difficult to think of a position for which a purchased SPARQS is a reasonable hedge. SPARQS are callable by the issuer at a time-varying schedule of call prices, decreasing their usefulness in hedging even those positions such as naked puts for which at first glance they might seem like useful hedges. Setting aside specific arguments about what positions are or are not naturally hedged by SPARQS, in order to believe that SPARQS are designed to satisfy investors' hedging needs one would need simultaneously to believe that the investors who purchase SPARQS (i) are sophisticated enough to understand that SPARQS hedge the position that they have; but (ii) too unsophisticated to be aware that the underlying common stock and exchange-traded options on it provide alternative fairly priced hedging vehicles.
Another possible hypothesis is that investors purchase SPARQS as a vehicle for compensating their stockbrokers for investment advisory services that they might provide. The finding that SPARQS have expected returns less than the riskless rate but covary positively with the broad market indices immediately raises doubts about the plausibility of this hypothesis-most investors would be better off investing in bank certificates of deposit. It is difficult to argue that the overpricing of SPARQS is a mechanism for compensating brokers for investment advice when the investor would have been better off not receiving advice to purchase SPARQS. However, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that the overpricing of SPARQS is a vehicle for compensating brokers for investment advice to purchase other products, though this seems unlikely.
The overpricing of SPARQS is, however, consistent with the hypothesis that banks and investment banks design SEPs to exploit investors' misunderstandings of financial markets, cognitive biases in evaluating probabilistic information, and framing effects. For example, Shefrin and Statman (1993) argue that narrow framing and loss aversion 25 can cause investors to demand positions 25 See Kahneman (2003), Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) , and Barberis and Huang (2005) .
that are similar to covered calls, and also make investors value a single security that provides these payoffs more highly than a portfolio of other securities that produces an equivalent payoff.
This dark side of financial innovation is in stark contrast to the generally benign view of financial innovations in most of the literature.
The demand for SPARQS is also consistent with overconfidence. In the behavioral literature, confidence is frequently modeled as the perceived precision of an information signal, 26 and an overconfident investor is one who believes that future returns are distributed narrowly around their expected outcome. Such an investor will value highly securities such as SPARQS because he or she will undervalue the embedded written call. This however does not provide an explanation of why investors might prefer SPARQS to covered call positions created using exchange-traded call options.
The finding that SPARQS have negative expected return does not allow one to distinguish among various hypotheses for why investors demand SPARQS. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the issuing banks and investment banks choose the payoff profiles. Henderson and Pearson
(2007) present evidence that investors make different choices, depending on the nature of the underlying asset-when the underlying asset is an individual equity the SEPs are typically shortterm with concave payoff profiles and high coupons, and when the the underlying asset is an index the SEPs are longer-term and provide principal protection. Exploring the reasons for these differences appears to be an interesting area for future research.
26 See, for example, Kyle and Wang (1997) , Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Odean (1999) .
where τ i + t is a calendar date. We make the following assumptions about the residuals:
( 
where if i = j (the same issue) then ρ ij = 1. To compute the right-hand side of (A.7) we estimated σ i , σ j , and ρ ij from the returns over the first 150 post-event days following the ith and jth issues. This involves computing σ j from the 150 post-event days following the jth issue, and computing ρ ij from the overlapping days. If there is no overlap in the ith and jth post-event windows, then there is no need to calculate ρ ij . Once we have computed the right-hand side of equation (A.7), the standard error is simply the square root of the variance and the t-statistic is straightforward. The next case involves testing the significance of the CARRs in equation (9), which are based on the SPARQS pricing model benchmark described by equation (6). Thus, it is necessary to compute the variance of the sum on the left-hand side of (9), which is the variance of the sum
Computation of this sum's variance is similar to the procedure for the sum in equation (A.1), where we make assumptions about the η's similar to the assumptions in (A.2) through (A.5) about the ε's. One difference is that we allow for the (negative) serial correlation in the errors at different dates. The source of η i,τ i +t is the pricing error of a derivative relative to its underlying stock, which seems likely to be (and in fact is) negatively serially correlated. We assume that the pricing errors for SPARQS i follow an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coefficient ζ i , or specifically that (A.9) 28 where γ ij = 1 for i = j. Thus, the variance of the sum (A.8) is A.11) where the function J is the autocorrelation function defined by
The final CARRs test statistic for which we derive standard errors are the CARRs for the SPARQSs' market model benchmark as described by equation (11). This case is more complicated because the residual is Ω it i,τ i +t + η i,τ i +t and thus has two components. If the residual ε i,τ i +t is homoskedastic then Ω i,τ i +t ε i,τ i +t and Ω it ε i,τ i +t + η i,τ i +t are not, implying that simply to mimic the method for the left-hand side of (9) is not correct. For this purpose, it is necessary to consider a procedure that recognizes Ω it ε i,τ i +t and η i,τ i +t are distinct errors with different properties, but correlated. To do this we need to specify the correlation between the ε's and the η's. Assume:
Then, the variance of the sum on the left-hand side of (11) is: 
where i = 1, . . . , N indexes the SPARQS and their underlying stocks, Ω
is the elasticity of the price of the ith SPARQS with respect to the stock price.
Combining the above equations results in a market model for the SPARQS based on the index return:
Panel A presents the CARRs of the SPARQS using the underlying stock return r i,t as a benchmark (i.e., it presents the cumulative η is the elasticity of the value of the ith SPARQS with respect to the stock price. Panel A also presents the equal-weighted average event-time premia of the market prices over the model prices. Panel B presents the equal-weighted cumulative event-time buy-and-hold returns to the SPARQS as well as benchmark returns formed by cumulating in event time returns of the form: These factor loadings were estimated using ordinary least squares with five years of monthly returns data from the five-year period immediately prior to the SPARQS' issue dates. 
